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Energy security – that is, the provision of adequate, reliable and affordable energy services to 
end-users in a socially acceptable and environmentally sustainable way – represents one of the 
world’s foremost challenges. Solving the world’s energy problems requires international 
cooperation. Some energy-related issues, such as high and volatile oil prices and rising carbon 
emissions, are global public ‘bads’ that cannot be effectively addressed by individual 
governments acting alone.1 Others, such as electricity deprivation in the Global South or the 
urgent need to research and diffuse breakthrough energy technologies, require the production 
of global public goods such as knowledge, financing, and standards (Van de Graaf, 2013b).  
 
In contrast to other transboundary issues such as trade or finance, there is no single 
international venue for energy policy deliberation and coordination. There is no ‘World 
Energy Organization’. Instead, global energy policy is splintered across different international 
organizations, forums and clubs, creating demands and opportunities for inter-organizational 
relations. The aim of this chapter is to explore some of these inter-organizational interactions 
in global energy governance.2  
 
Starting point is the International Energy Agency (IEA), which is widely recognized as the 
focal organization in this policy domain (Colgan, 2009; Kohl, 2010; Leverett, 2010; Florini, 
2011; Van de Graaf, 2012). After reviewing the policy field and literature, the chapter 
discusses the IEA’s role within the global energy architecture. Then, it studies the interactions 
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between the IEA and four other energy-relevant organizations: the Organization of the 
Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), the G8 and G20, 
and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA).  
 
General overview of the policy field and literature 
 
Global energy governance is a nascent but growing field of study that breaks with the narrow 
geopolitical frameworks that long dominated the study of international energy politics 
(Baccini et al., 2013; Colgan et al., 2012; Florini and Sovacool, 2009 and 2011; Goldthau and 
Witte, 2009; Lesage et al., 2009; Van de Graaf, 2013b; Karlsson-Vinkhuyzen, 2010). Scholars 
of global energy governance focus on the rules, norms, markets and institutions that govern 
international energy relations. Given the absence of a single multilateral framework for 
energy governance, many studies have sought to map the fragmented patchwork of regimes, 
forums, organizations and clubs that all bring to bear different perspectives on the 
international regulation of the energy sector (Lesage et al., 2009; Florini and Sovacool, 2012). 
 
The major actors and configurations of energy governance that figure prominently in these 
writings can roughly be grouped into three categories. First, there is a group of energy-
specific international organizations, including the IEA, OPEC, ECT, the International Energy 
Forum (IEF), and IRENA.3 Second, there is a group of international organizations that have a 
mandate that extends well beyond the energy sector but whose activities have significant 
influence on energy matters. Examples include the World Bank (and other regional 
development banks), the G8 and G20, and the EU (and other regional organizations). Finally, 
there are also important non-governmental organizations and networks that influence global 
energy governance. 
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Numerous scholars have set out to evaluate the performance of individual organizations 
within this policy field, such as the IEA (Colgan, 2009; Kohl, 2010; Leverett, 2010; Florini, 
2011; Van de Graaf, 2012; Colgan and Van de Graaf, forthcoming), the G8 and G20 (Lesage 
et al., 2009; Van de Graaf and Westphal, 2011), OPEC (Goldthau and Witte, 2011; Colgan, 
2014), the World Bank (Nakhooda, 2011), and IRENA (Van de Graaf, 2013; Urpelainen and 
Van de Graaf, forthcoming). Some of these scholars have acknowledged that it is necessary to 
look beyond the boundaries of such single organizations to fully apprehend the functioning of 
a specific multilateral energy organization (e.g., Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2009). 
 
Victor et al. (2006) have gone a step further and have characterized the institutional 
architecture of global energy governance as a ‘regime complex’. They note that energy 
organizations have been mostly created in a bottom-up and fragmented fashion, often in 
response to external shocks. Over time, however, the links between energy organizations have 
grown, mainly because of two shifts in the structure of the underlying issue area: (1) the prime 
energy sources (oil, coal, and gas) have become increasingly fungible across uses, in part 
because of global electrification, and (2) the emergence of environmental policies, which has 
affected all energy sources and carriers. 
 
Regime complex theory has since become the most prevalent approach to discuss the 
fragmentation of global energy governance. Colgan et al. (2012), for example, argue that the 
energy regime complex has behaved in a peculiar way, characterized by alternating periods of 
rapid institutional innovation and long periods of stasis, thus mimicking a pattern that 
paleontologist Stephen Gould described as ‘punctuated equilibrium’. Van de Graaf (2013b) 
provides an explanation for the fragmented development of global energy organizations, and 
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hence the emergence of an energy regim complex, based on three grounds: strategically, it 
reflects the dispersion of state interests and power with regard to energy; functionally, it 
mirrors the variance of functional attributes of the diverse range of energy issues; and 
organizationally, it is a byproduct of path dependencies. Using network analysis and spatial 
econometrics, Baccini et al. (2013) show that countries form and join international energy 
organizations in response to accession by main trading partners and direct competitors in the 
oil and gas sector.  
 
The global energy architecture and the IEA  
 
Compared with other issue areas such as trade and security, where a set of multilateral 
organizations was created after 1945, states have been much slower to build international 
organizations for energy security governance. In fact, until the IEA’s creation in the early 
1970s, there was almost no structured energy cooperation among the world’s major energy 
consuming nations. Only in the area of nuclear energy a multilateral institution was created in 
the form of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), established in Vienna in 1957, 
because of the close link between atomic power and global peace and security. 
 
The lack of sustained multilateral energy cooperation before the 1970s reflected the fact that 
national energy markets were mostly autarkic. Coal was the single most important 
commercial fuel until 1966 (Smil, 2005, p. 15), but only a fraction of the coal produced 
globally was traded across borders. The explanation is that coal reserves are spread out 
geographically quite evenly and the biggest consumers of coal were endowed with large 
indigenous coal reserves. After the Second World War, oil began to erode coal’s dominant 
position and became the first commercial fuel to be traded across borders in large quantities. 
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Still, there was no perceived need to create international organizations to govern or regulate 
these growing flows of oil, because the major western powers benefited from the fact that 
international oil trade was dominated by the so-called ‘Seven Sisters’, a small group of 
vertically integrated oil companies that had effectively formed a cartel in the interwar period 
and controlled the bulk of world oil trade. 
 
The first oil shock of 1973-1974 would completely change the situation. A few Arab countries 
imposed oil embargoes on the United States and the Netherlands, which had supported Israel 
in the Yom Kippur War of October 1973. The export ban was later extended to Portugal, 
South Africa and Rhodesia. As a result, oil supplies fell about 9 percent on a global scale 
between October and December 1973 (Yergin, 1991). The major oil-consuming countries 
reacted to this crisis in an uncoordinated and competitive manner. Some pressured their oil 
companies into giving them a preferential treatment. Others imposed restrictions on the export 
of petroleum. Larger countries’ companies bid up oil prices on the spot market. European 
countries sought to distance themselves from the Dutch and appease the Arabs. The situation 
resembled a classical collective action dilemma: the major importing countries  each adopted 
a narrowly self-interested approach, thus aggravating the crisis for everyone (Keohane 1984).  
 
In response, American Secretary of State Kissinger convened an energy conference in 
Washington in February 1974. The existing institutional arrangements for addressing energy 
issues, mainly through the committee structure of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), were perceived as incapable of decisive action. 
Kissinger therefore wanted to create a new organization. Initially he intended to set up an 
anti-OPEC consumer’s cartel, but the European states and Japan, which were much more 
vulnerable to oil supply interruptions than the United States, successfully resisted this call 
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(Katz, 1981). By November 1974 agreement was reached on the International Energy 
Program, establishing the IEA as an autonomous agency of the OECD. The IEA’s secretariat 
was housed in Paris, but ironically France did not join the IEA because it preferred to 
maintain good (bilateral) relations with the Arab countries.  
 
The IEA’s nesting within the OECD thus represents an interesting case of organizational 
overlap. Since the IEA was created at the height of a severe oil crisis, its founding fathers 
wanted to have the new agency operational as soon as possible. They therefore chose to 
embed the IEA within the OECD, a functioning organization with headquarters, a staff policy, 
et cetera, rather than to establish the new agency from scratch. Strikingly, bureaucrats from 
the OECD itself participated in the negotiations over the IEA’s institutional design, which 
they were able to influence. For example, the OECD Secretary General won the right to 
nominate the IEA Executive Director, while states only approve or disapprove the 
Secretary General’s choice (Johnson and Urpelainen, 2014).  
 
The decision to nest the IEA within the OECD still has far-reaching consequences for the 
IEA’s functioning today: the requirement of prior OECD membership means that the IEA’s 
doors are effectively shut for some of today’s major oil-importing countries such as China and 
India—a classical illustration of the concept of path dependency. Not surprisingly, the IEA-
OECD relationship has come under strain. In 2009, the IEA’s Deputy Executive Director 
compared the institutional linkage to ‘being 35 years old and still living with your parents.’4   
 
The IEA was endowed with two principal tasks. One is to manage what is called the ‘oil-
sharing system’, an emergency management scheme to cope with potential oil supply 
shortfalls. Every IEA member country is obliged to keep strategic petroleum reserves 
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equivalent to 90 days of imports. In times of oil supply disruptions, these oil stocks can be 
tapped and even shared with other member countries, in accordance with a complex formula 
developed in the IEA’s treaty and overseen by the agency’s secretariat. The second major task 
of the IEA is to collect and disseminate information, not just on the oil market but on a wide 
range of energy markets and technologies. This information function has become the hallmark 
of the IEA’s day-to-day functioning. 
 
In its forty years of existence, the IEA has had to adapt to a changing global energy landscape 
(Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2009; Van de Graaf, 2012). Its membership has expanded from the 
sixteen original signatory states to 29 member states, all drawn from the OECD. In addition, it 
increasingly reaches out to non-member states such as China and India by inviting them to 
internal meetings and publishing studies of their energy sectors. The IEA has also adopted a 
much more flexible and market-based oil emergency response policy, whereby it prefers to 
release oil stocks onto the global market rather than allocate them from above to needy 
member states as the IEA’s founding treaty had originally stipulated. In its forty years of 
existence, the IEA has only drawn stocks three times: after the first Gulf War (1991), 
Hurricane Katrina (2005), and the war in Libya (2011). A final change  at the IEA has been its 
gradual embrace of a much broader energy security agenda. A child of the oil agitation of  the 
1970s, it has enlarged its scope beyond the oil markets to deal with energy policy writ large, 
including natural gas and electricity markets, renewables and the interactions between energy 
and climate policy.  
 
Still, the IEA’s relative adaptability has not prevented states from creating other international 
organizations in the same task environment as the IEA, most notably the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). The oil-consumers 
8 
 
regime centered around the IEA has thus morphed into a broader energy ‘regime complex’ 
(Colgan et al., 2012). Back in 1974, the IEA was virtually the only international organization 
dealing with energy policy coordination for consuming countries. Today, there are plenty, and 
they are not just dealing with oil anymore but also with issues such as energy investment 
(ECT) and renewables (IRENA). Moreover, the change in the IEA’s orientation has brought 
the agency within the operational radius of other organizations, such as the United Nations 
International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As a result, international energy organizations 
increasingly ‘bump’ against each other in terms of mandate, membership and resources. This 
has created a need for inter-organizational dialogue and coordination. The next section hones 
in on the IEA’s four key dyadic interactions: with OPEC, the ECT, the G8 and G20, and 
IRENA. To guide the reader in the maze of energy organizations, two tables were introduced. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the different organizations discussed in this chapter, their key 
objectives and their members, while Table 2 summarizes the degree of membership overlap 
between each dyad. 
 
Table 1. Main energy-related international organizations, their objectives and members 
 Date 
created 
Key 
objectives 
Members 
OPEC 1960 Increase 
rents for oil-
exporting 
countries 
Algeria, Angola, Ecuador, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, 
Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Venezuela  
(12) 
IEA 1974 Coordinate 
energy 
security 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
9 
 
policies for 
consuming 
countries, 
including 
strategic oil 
stocks 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, UK, US  
(29) 
G7/8 1975 Coordinate 
economic 
policies of 
major 
western 
powers (and 
Russia) 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK, US, 
Russia* 
(7/8) 
ECT 1994 Regulate 
cross-border 
energy trade 
between 
Europe and 
the Former 
Soviet 
Union 
Afghanistan,  Albania,  Armenia,  Austria,  Azerbaijan,  
Belgium,  Bosnia and Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 
Cyprus,  Czech Republic,  Denmark,  Estonia,  EU,  
Finland,  France, Georgia,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  
Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan,  Latvia,  
Liechtenstein,  Lithuania, Luxembourg,  Malta,  
Moldova,  Mongolia, Netherlands,  Poland,  Portugal,  
Romania,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,  
Switzerland,  Tajikistan,  Macedonia, Turkey,  
Turkmenistan,  Ukraine,  UK,  Uzbekistan 
(48) 
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IEF 2001 Encourage 
global oil 
and gas 
producer-
consumer 
dialogue 
and data 
transparency 
Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brunei, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chad, China, Comoros, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, 
Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Guinea, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Kuwait, 
Malaysia, Mali, Mauretania, Mexico, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, 
Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Philippines, Poland, 
Qatar, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, 
Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Uganda, United Arab Emirates, US, UK, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia 
(76) 
G20 2008 Apex 
informal 
forum for 
global 
economic 
governance 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, 
Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, 
UK, US, and EU 
(20) 
IRENA 2009 Support 
widespread 
adoption 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, 
Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, 
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and 
sustainable 
use of 
renewable 
energy 
Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brunei 
Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape 
Verde, China, Cote D'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, 
EU, Fiji, Finland, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, 
Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guyana, Iceland, India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, 
Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Latvia, 
Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, 
Montenegro, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, 
Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts 
and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, 
Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, 
Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, 
Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, The former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Togo, Tonga, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, 
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United Arab Emirates, UK, US, Uruguay, Vanuatu, 
Yemen, Zambia 
(135) 
Notes:  
Members denote countries that signed and ratified the treaties of the respective organizations 
as of October 2014. It does not include observers. 
* In the wake of the 2013-2014 Ukraine crisis, Russia’s membership of the G8 was suspended 
 
 
Table 2. Matrix of membership overlap between international energy organizations 
OPEC 12 
IEA 0 29 
G7/8 0 7 7/8 
ECT 0 23 5 48 
IEF 11 24 7/8 22 76 
G20 1 11 7/8 7 17 20 
IRENA 10 25 6 38 63 17 135 
 OPEC IEA G7/8 ECT IEF G20 IRENA 
 
Note: Cells indicate number of shared member countries 
 
An organization-set analysis of the IEA 
 
The IEA and OPEC 
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The IEA was created with explicit reference to OPEC, which was regarded by some western 
countries as the main culprit for the first oil shock.5 The American Secretary of State Henry 
Kissinger argued that the actions of OPEC could cause the ‘economic strangulation’ of the 
West and constitute a casus belli if they were carried any further (Mabro, 1991). Kissinger did 
not resort to military action, however. Instead, he proposed  to establish the IEA as an oil 
consumers’ cartel to counter OPEC’s influence in world oil markets (Kissinger, 1982). On 
European and Japanese insistence, the anti-OPEC stance was toned down. Japan and Europe 
were much more vulnerable to oil supply disruptions than the United States (which, at the 
time, imported only one-third of its oil needs), and thus they were wary of antagonizing the 
very nations that were in control of their economic lifelines (Katz, 1981). Consequently, in the 
IEA’s founding treaty, an explicit aim was to develop good working relations with the oil 
producers (IEP Agreement, 1974, articles 44-48). 
 
Yet, especially in the early years, the relations between the IEA and OPEC remained 
adversarial. This was illustrated during the North-South Conference of 1975-1977, in Paris, 
which had been organized at the initiative of France in cooperation with Saudi Arabia. The 
conference had raised hopes for a constructive oil producer-consumer dialogue but produced 
disappointing results. OPEC and the IEA were unable to agree on even the most basic issues, 
such as continuing consultations on energy, due to rivalries at the member state level. The US, 
in particular, would not even contemplate any engagement with OPEC, since it had a ‘residual 
dislike for cartels, OPEC and those “unreliable suppliers of the Middle East”,’ while the UK 
and Germany were also reluctant to ‘legitimize those oil cartel guys.’6  
 
The result of these rivalries was that, for years, there were no formal inter-organizational 
relations between the IEA and OPEC and the two organizations communicated only 
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indirectly, through the media. For example, in 1990, when Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait took 4.3 
million barrels per day out of the oil market, OPEC members agreed to ‘increase production, 
according to need’ and called on the oil consumers ‘to actively participate in the stabilisation 
process.’ A few days later, the Executive Director of the IEA, Mrs Helga Steeg, issued a 
statement that welcomed OPEC’s increase in oil production but also noted that the proposal 
‘for a link between a production increase by OPEC and government stock draw by the IEA, as 
well as for a joint meeting between IEA and OPEC Ministers, is not feasible, politically or 
economically’ (quoted in Fattouh and Van der Linde, 2011, p. 58). This illustrates that the 
water between the IEA and OPEC was still too deep to establish any kind of direct inter-
organizational relations. It also shows that the absence of formal relations between 
international organizations does not necessarily mean that there is no interaction whatsoever. 
 
Dr. Subroto, who was OPEC’s Secretary-General from 1988-94 later recalled that ‘for many 
years prior to 1988 and during the early part of my time at the Secretariat, the relationship 
between the two organizations was one of cat and mouse. It often felt like the two 
organizations were crossing swords every time they met’ (Griffin, 2010).  
 
Nevertheless, in the wake of the Gulf War, France and Venezuela took the initiative to 
organize a ‘Ministerial Seminar’ of producers and consumers, which with the help of the 
Norwegians, led to the first meeting in Paris in 1991. This meeting was very significant since, 
‘at that time, the word “dialogue” was seen very much as taboo’ (Griffin, 2010). Some key 
countries (such as the US, the UK, Japan and Saudi Arabia) showed little interest in the 
dialogue and were only represented at a junior level, yet the dialogue continued throughout 
the 1990s in a series of biannual international energy conferences. 
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In 1995, the heads of the IEA and OPEC met for the first time bilaterally. The secret meeting 
took place in Vienna, not at OPEC headquarters, but in a hotel. Clearly, such a meeting was at 
the time a highly innovative move. Both directors, Robert Priddle of the IEA and Rilwani 
Lukman of OPEC, had only just taken office a few months earlier. Because of reservations of 
some of their member governments, they had to proceed with care and made no formal report 
back to their respective organizations (Priddle, 2007). When Robert Priddle asked his staff to 
arrange a meeting with the secretary-general of OPEC, he encountered surprised reactions 
even from within his own entourage (Willenborg et al., 2004, p. 40). This meeting between 
the heads of both organizations paved the way for a thaw and normalization of relations (Van 
de Graaf and Lesage, 2009), illustrating the importance of individual leadership in 
establishing inter-organizational relations.  
 
The role of individuals was also important in spurring a change in the attitude of the US, 
arguably the IEA’s most important member. In 2000, the US agreed to participate at the 
ministerial level in the biannual OPEC-IEA meetings  which had, by then, become routine 
and which were soon afterwards to be institutionalized by the creation of a permanent 
secretariat of the International Energy Forum (IEF), based in Riyadh. Interestingly, the change 
in attitude in the US was the product of idiosyncratic factors. Bill Richardson, the Energy 
Secretary in the Clinton administration, ‘never met a travel opportunity he didn’t like. The 
ultimate peripatetic Secretary. His staff was still counseling against Secretarial attendance of 
the event more out of the policy momentum of the US historic [anti-dialogue] approach than 
the result of any fresh look at the institution of Producer/Consumer Dialogue.’7 
 
By 2002, Robert Priddle could meet openly and publicly with the then secretary-general of 
OPEC, Dr. Silva Calderon. They met at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 
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Johannesburg; and, a week later, at the World Petroleum Congress in Rio, they spoke jointly 
at an IEA-OPEC lunch and staged the first-ever joint press conference (Priddle, 2007). That 
amount of joint activity would have been inconceivable just a few years before.  
 
The dialogue further warmed when Claude Mandil took office as the new head of the IEA in 
2003, and the informal IEA-OPEC collaboration intensified. In this period, Deputy Executive 
Director of the IEA, William C. Ramsay, built up ‘a strong dialogue below the horizon’ with 
OPEC and the major Gulf countries.8 During the 2003 Iraq war, and again during the 
hurricanes Rita and Katrina in 2005, the IEA-OPEC informal coordination went a step further. 
It had become clear that both producers and consumers had an interest in a stable market. 
Producers had been ravaged by the market share strategy of Saudi Arabia in 1985 and 1986, 
which led to a collapse in oil prices, and IEA members with large producing sectors (United 
States, United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and Norway) had suffered right along.  
 
In other words, even though the IEA could have acted in response to the events in 2003 that 
led to tight oil markets (the Iraq war, a strike in the Venezuelan oil sector, and unrest in 
Nigeria) by releasing oil from its strategic reserves, it preferred to informally coordinate with 
OPEC countries with spare capacity to pump more oil. The IEA’s governing board hammered 
out a strategy whereby the IEA would refrain from releasing oil stocks if OPEC could 
guarantee that it will make up any supply shortfall. When the IEA finally did decide to release 
oil from its reserves in the wake of the hurricanes of 2005, it did so only because there was a 
lack of refined oil products (the hurricanes had wiped out much of the refining capacity in the 
Gulf of Mexico), which OPEC could not deliver. 
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In sum, in spite of the fact that the IEA was initially created to offset OPEC’s market power, 
today both organizations have established a good working relationship. They hold annual joint 
technical workshops, work together on energy data in the IEF, and release joint reports (some 
of which were commissioned by the G20 in recent years). There even appears to be a tacit 
agreement that, in case of a sudden oil supply crisis, OPEC’s spare capacity is to be tapped 
before the IEA’s strategic stocks are released (Emerson, 2006). The rapprochement was 
epitomized and cemented by the creation of an entirely new international organization, the 
IEF. Several driving forces contributed to the establishment of IEA-OPEC interorganizational 
relations, which were long blocked due to rivalry between their respective member states. 
What stands out is the role of individuals, and most notably the executive leadership of both 
organizations, in facilitating the dialogue through informal meetings. These audacious steps 
illustrate that international organizations are not merely reflections of member state 
preferences, but have scope for autonomous agency.  
 
The IEA and ECT 
 
The organizations examined so far, OPEC and the IEA, have long been the only meaningful 
multilateral energy arrangements in place. What they have in common is that they operate at 
the global level and that their rules mainly pertain to the oil markets. After the end of the Cold 
War, they were joined by a new international organization, the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
The ECT was formally created in 1994 on a more regional level to govern the energy relations 
(and, particularly, the natural gas relations) between Europe and the newly independent states 
in the former Soviet Union. It is headquartered in Brussels, Belgium, and has some fifty 
member states (Wälde, 1996; Konoplyanik and Wälde, 2006). Interestingly, it is one of the 
few cases where the EU itself is a full member in another international organization. 
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During the negotiations for such a new organization, a contentious point was the relationship 
between the ECT and existing international organizations. The European Commission was 
keen on keeping the implementation and secretarial support in its own hands, but this was 
objected by the Netherlands, Germany and Britain (Mayer, 2008; Matláry, 1997, p. 116). The 
Netherlands proposed to establish a small supporting secretariat, which would be located at 
the IEA in Paris. The possibility of integrating the Charter process into the Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was also envisaged (Mayer, 2008, p. 264). In the 
end, no less than four European locations were suggested for the ECT’s headquarters, namely 
Paris (close to the IEA), Brussels (close to the EU), Vienna (close to OPEC, IAEA and, since 
1995, the OSCE), and Geneva (close to GATT) (Wälde, 1994, p. 366). 
 
Initially the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Energy took up the secretarial 
functions in support of the negotiations of the Energy Charter. It had set up a special section 
to work exclusively on the Charter. This way, the Commission successfully maneuvered itself 
in such a way that it became the leading policy-maker in the process. The location of the 
Charter process within the EU was supposed to be temporarily, until a definitive solution 
could be reached. However, as Matláry (1997, p. 117) has observed: ‘while the states were 
trying to decide which international organization should be the seat of the charter, the 
Commission had gone to work and had completely taken over the process by defining the 
topics for negotiation, and then, after this framework had been established, presenting it to the 
states … The states were almost presented with a fait accompli.’ After an interim period 
where the European Commission served as the treaty’s secretariat, a separate ECT 
headquarters was created in Brussels. 
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The IEA’s official reaction to the Charter process was remarkably low-key. In June 1991, the 
IEA ministers ‘noted with interest the expressed objectives of the proposed European Energy 
Charter.’ They further declared that ‘the development of any Charter and protocols thereto 
should be non-discriminatory, and the European Community, the IEA and other international 
organizations should cooperate closely’ (Scott, 1995, pp. 452-3). Ever since, the IEA has 
neglected the ECT, mostly because of the internal difficulties the ECT was having. While it 
entered into force in 1998, the ECT failed to convince key energy importing countries such as 
the United States and exporting countries, including Russia, Norway and the OPEC members, 
to commit to the ECT. Russia applied the treaty on a provisional basis until 2009, when it 
fully withdrew itself from the process. This has left the whole process in disarray and the ECT 
continues to search for its ‘competitive niche’ in the galaxy of international energy 
organizations (Konoplyanik and Wälde, 2006). 
 
The internal troubles and loss of momentum at the ECT have lowered incentives for both the 
ECT and the IEA to engage in inter-organizational dialogue. Officials at the ECT have been 
very much inward-looking, while the IEA staff did not pay much attention to this young 
organization, which had trouble to manifest itself. Occasionally, both organizations have 
collaborated in an ad-hoc fashion, producing joint reports or organizing joint workshops, but 
all in all this cooperation remains rather unstructured and thin. In the eyes of Claude Mandil, 
former Executive Director at the IEA, the ECT staff should be moved from Brussels to Paris 
so that it could work under the auspices of the IEA (Mandil, 2008). Yet, both practically and 
politically the idea of an institutional merger raises a lot of questions, if only because there is 
no complete membership overlap between the ECT and the IEA as Table 2 shows. 
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Interestingly, the ECT has a strong network of ‘observers’ consisting both of states and 
international organizations. Currently, no less than 11 international organizations have been 
granted observer status in the ECT, including the IEA and IRENA.9 Observers have the right 
to attend all meetings of the ECT. They also have the right to receive all related 
documentation, reports and analyses, and to participate in the working debates taking place 
within the ECT process (ECT, 2012). Such observer status allows other international 
bureaucrats to have a finger on the pulse of what is going on within the ECT, allowing both 
sides to identify synergies and avoid duplication of work. 
 
The IEA and G8/G20 
 
Since the 2005 G8 Gleneagles summit, an intense interaction process has developed between 
the G8 and the IEA. This interaction has gone so far that the IEA is sometimes even portrayed 
as the G8’s de facto energy secretariat. The Executive Director of the IEA was invited to 
every single G8 summit between 2005 and 2009, when energy featured high on the G8’s 
agenda. In contrast, the Secretary-General of the OECD (of which the IEA is a daughter 
organization) was only invited to a G8 summit for the first time in 2007. The IEA also issued 
numerous publications on a number of energy topics in response to the Gleneagles Plan of 
Action and subsequent energy commitments undertaken at the G8 (Lesage et al., 2009).  
 
By and large, IEA has taken on 4 major roles in response to the calls from the G8: namely, 
that of think tank, institutional designer, secretarial support unit, and external monitoring 
body. First, the IEA has served as a sort of think tank from which the G8 could tap expertise. 
In Gleneagles, the IEA was asked to conduct analysis with regard to energy efficiency, 
cleaner fossil fuels, carbon capture and storage, and renewables,  issues that at the time were 
21 
 
not part of the IEA’s core working program. In each of these areas, the IEA was asked to 
identify problems and come up with creative policy solutions. 
 
Second, the IEA has helped the G8 to set up new institutions and networks. The IEA 
secretariat has helped to establish the Sustainable Buildings Network (SBN), the International 
Platform on Energy Efficiency Cooperation (IPEEC) and the Low Carbon Energy Technology 
Platform (LCETP). Two things are worth noting here: one, most of these new institutions 
were nested within the IEA’s secretariat. Two, they all involve non-members of the IEA, most 
notably emerging powers, thus helping the IEA to reach out to non-member countries in a 
way that is not provided in its founding treaty. 
 
Third, the IEA has also taken on some secretarial functions. For example, the IEA provided 
logistical support to the energy working group of the Heiligendamm dialogue process, 
launched at the 2007 G8 summit to facilitate dialogue between the G8 and its emerging 
partners on a range of topics, including energy efficiency. Although the dialogue’s secretariat 
– or ‘support unit’ as it was officially called – was located at the OECD headquarters, it was 
actually the IEA that logistically supported the energy working group. The energy working 
group was co-chaired by Canada and India. Four specific topics were singled out: energy 
security, sustainable buildings, power generation, and renewable energy.  
 
Finally, in a few cases, the IEA was also used as an external monitoring body that verifies the 
compliance of the G8 countries with their own commitments. In 2008, IEA was allowed to 
comment on G8 countries self-assessment reports with regard to Global Energy Security 
Principles agreed at in 2006. The IEA was allowed to do the same for the self-assessment 
reports of the G20 countries with regard to their fossil fuel subsidies. 
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How can the emergence of this close interaction process between the G8 and G20 be 
explained? At least three factors could be identified that facilitated the close relationship. First 
and rather obvious is the agenda convergence. The relationship would not have developed in 
the same way if Tony Blair and the UK government had not decided to put energy as a 
priority theme on the agenda of the Gleneagles summit, along with development. For Blair it 
was a way of trying to counter the negative image he had built up in previous years by siding 
closely with the Bush administration during the Iraq war. The energy themes on the G8’s 
agenda were also a sort of ‘climate policy in disguise’. Climate was a very sensitive and 
delicate topic for the Bush administration and emerging powers, but on energy there was still 
enough common ground to be found. Moreover, issue complexity also helped to foster inter-
institutional linkages. Energy matters tend to be highly complex and technical, so the G8 
needed expertise if it wanted to address these issues in a credible manner. It was a small step 
then to turn to the IEA, which is widely recognized as the leading authority on energy policy 
matters. 
 
Secondly, it appears that personal ties also mattered, just like in the case of OPEC-IEA 
rapprochement. In 2005 the UK government was hosting the G8 summit. At the same time, a 
British national, Joan MacNaughton, served as the chair of the IEA’s Governing Board, the 
highest decision-making body within the IEA. The fact that both institutions were steered by 
the UK probably facilitated the linkage. In a similar vein, the large degree of membership 
overlap between the G8 and IEA also facilitated the process. Seven G8 members are in the 
IEA (see Table 2). The only exception is Russia but Moscow has always acquiesced to the 
close ties that were being built between the two institutions. These seven G8 members that are 
in the IEA are able to wield significant influence within the agency. In fact, one could say that 
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they effectively control the IEA, both formally (that is, in terms of voting power) and 
informally (Colgan and Van de Graaf, forthcoming). So, the institutional power of the G7 
within the IEA was another facilitating factor. 
 
 
With the crowning of the leaders’ G20 to as the apex forum for global economic governance 
at the Pittsburgh summit in November 2009, energy policy matters have slipped away from 
the G8’s agenda and have been increasingly addressed by the G20 (Van de Graaf and 
Westphal, 2011). While the G20 has continued to cooperate closely with the IEA, the Paris-
based energy agency is no longer exclusively the organization of choice assisting the G20 
leaders in their energy work. This is obviously related to the fact that the emerging countries 
in the G20 are not represented within the IEA. Instead, the G20 now delegates much of its 
energy work to the different organizations at the same time. For example, the IEA is working 
in support of the G20’s pledge on eliminating fossil fuel subsidies but has to share ownership 
over this process with other institutions, notably the IEF, the OECD and OPEC. The widening 
of the G8 to the G20 thus meant that inter-organizational ties and networks in global energy 
governance were also expanded.  
 
The close collaboration between the IEA and the G8 (and, to a lesser extent, the G20) is a 
two-way process. The G-clubs give impulses to the IEA, but the IEA’s staff has also actively 
sought political validation by world leaders for its work and even to expand its turf. The G-
processes can facilitate internal reforms in international organizations by tasking particular 
organizations to work in new areas. The G8’s calls have been a real shot in the arm for the 
IEA’s outreach policy and its climate-related work. The G8 and G20 have also functioned as a 
sort of megaphone to amplify the IEA’s agenda-setting power. Conversely, the G8’s 
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interaction with the IEA has created path dependencies (e.g., through built-in agendas) that 
have kept energy issues longer on the G8’s agenda (Van de Graaf and Lesage, 2009). 
 
The IEA and IRENA 
  
The International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) was created in 2009 as a new, 
standalone international organization. Curiously, the creation of IRENA was spearheaded by a 
few member countries of the IEA, Germany, Denmark and Spain, even though the IEA had 
been working on renewables since the early 1980s. These countries were dissatisfied with 
what they regarded as the IEA’s overly positive attitude towards the fossil and nuclear energy 
industries, at the detriment of the renewable energy sector (Van de Graaf, 2013a). Thus, they 
chose to strike out on their own and create a new international organization from scratch.  
This was a major blow to the IEA. High-ranked officials from the IEA tried to block the 
creation of the new renewables agency, which they regarded as an intruder on their turf (Van 
de Graaf, 2013a). Yet, they could not prevent an institutional exit of some of their members 
with regard to renewable energy and IRENA was eventually created. The birth of IRENA 
served as a salutary shock to the IEA, which in response upgraded its renewable energy unit 
into a full-fledged division. After an initial period of mutual distrust, in January 2012, the 
heads of both the IEA and IRENA signed a letter indicating their intention to cooperate 
closely on data gathering and related issues.10 
 
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research 
 
As these few dyadic case studies illustrate, there is a significant variance in the degree and 
type of networking among international energy organizations, both across dyads and over 
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time. The good and depoliticized working relationship that has developed between the IEA 
and OPEC since the turn of the millennium, for example, contrasts sharply with the rivalry 
that characterized their relationship in the 1970s. Close ties have also developed between the 
IEA and IRENA, which have managed to put their initial differences and distrust aside and 
now formally cooperate on a renewable energy policies and measures database. The IEA and 
the G8 have developed a bond that is at the same time warmer and more informal – that is, at 
least, until 2009, when their interaction waned as energy slipped off the G8’s agenda.  
 
The ECT and the IEA, by contrast, do not interact with the same intensity, and this in spite of 
their very substantial overlap in terms of membership and scope. Even though the IEA is an 
observer within the ECT, the relationship has largely remained ad hoc and surprisingly thin. 
The prime reason why this dyadic relationship differs from the broader pattern of increasing 
networking among energy organizations seems to be the fact that the ECT has been a troubled 
organization from the start. It has failed to convince key governments (most notably, Russia 
and Norway as major suppliers on the Eurasian continent, and the US as the world’s foremost 
power) to ratify its treaty. The ECT has thus largely been inconsequential during its existence, 
which was most painfully illustrated during the 2006 and 2009 gas disputes between Ukraine 
and Russia, when the ECT secretariat failed to play any role of significance. 
 
Moving forward, global energy governance offers fertile ground to explore some of the 
assertions of the emerging literature on inter-organizational networking. One possible 
question for future research concerns the connection between inter- and intra-organizational 
change. Clearly, the fact that the IEA is embedded in an environment of other organizations 
has implications for its own, intra-organizational development. Inter-organizational ties can 
help shape an organization’s own development and institutional trajectory. Another question 
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that deserves attention pertains to how an institutional newcomer in a dense organizational 
field carves out a particular niche for itself. The most notable example here is IRENA, which 
came into being in 2009 in a very competitive institutional landscape. Its current Director-
General, Adnan Amin, has engaged in intensive inter-organizational diplomacy, signing a 
cooperation agreement with the IEA and setting up relations with a very diverse array of 
international organizations, from OPEC over the ECT to the World Meteorological 
Organization. His zealous forging of inter-organizational links might be a means for creating 
legitimacy and significance for the freshly created IRENA, a hypothesis that corresponds to 
the resource-need perspective on inter-organizational networking. 
 
IRENA raises another issue that warrants further consideration, namely the location of the 
secretariat. IRENA is one of the very few international organizations that is headquartered in 
the Middle East (notably in Abu Dhabi), although it also has a Technology Centre in Bonn, 
Germany, and a liaison office in Vienna. Does its remote location constrain its abilities to 
network with other international organizations? Such a question might also be relevant for an 
organization like the United Nations Environment Program, which is based in Nairobi, Kenya 
(Ivanova, 2010). These and other questions call for further research into the drivers, forms and 
consequences of inter-organizational relations, both in global energy governance and beyond. 
Notes 
1 A public bad, in economics, is any product that decreases the well-being of the public in a non-excludable (no 
one can escape its consumption) and non-rival (one person’s consumption does not diminish the amount 
available for others to consume) way. A typical example is air pollution. 
2 Here I deliberately use the term ‘interactions’ rather than ‘relations’ because two organizations can influence 
each other’s performance and development even in the absence of a formal inter-organizational relationship. For 
example, the IEA and OPEC were adversarial organizations without direct relations after the first oil shock and 
throughout most of the 1970s and 1980s. Yet, even if there was no direct relationship, the two organizations 
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communicated indirectly. For example, when OPEC staged a press conference, the IEA responded by issuing its 
own press release. To capture these dynamics the broader rubric of ‘interactions’ is preferred. 
3 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is often left out of this list since it is more a security-focused 
organization than an institution that governs energy policy. 
4 Remark by Ambassador Richard Jones, Deputy Executive Director of the IEA, during a conference on “Global 
Energy Governance,” organized by the French think-tank IFRI at its headquarters in Paris, 26 March 2009. 
5 This is somewhat ironic since OPEC as an organization actually played a very minor role in the first oil shock. 
It had not been OPEC but a different organization that had instigated the crisis, namely OAPEC, the 
Organization of Arab Petroleum-Exporting Countries. 
6 Personal communication with William C. Ramsay, IEA Deputy Executive Director from 1999 to 2008, June 6, 
2010. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Interview with William C. Ramsay, IEA Deputy Executive Director from 1999 to 2008, Brussels, 5 May 2010. 
9 The full list of observers can be consulted at the ECT’s website, through www.encharter.org.  
10 ‘New IRENA-IEA partnership will heighten technology and innovation co-operation,’ IRENA press release, 
January 16, 2012, available from: 
http://www.irena.org/News/Description.aspx?NType=A&PriMenuID=16&catid=17&News_ID=173#sthash.Td2
MaP7Z.dpufpress release. 
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